Fachmi Pachlevi Yandra, Dheni Indra Kusuma




Budget participation raises the problem of opportunistic behavior in the form of budgetary slack. Budget slack occurs when employees try to use information to overestimate the estimated resources needed or reduce the estimated income that can be achieved to make it easier for them to achieve cost efficiency and performance targets, so that they get better performance evaluation scores. In terms of accounting, organizations try to prevent or reduce slack behavior because it has consequences for the loss of opportunities for profits or increased costs. This study aims to conduct laboratory experiments to test the role of self-certification as a variable capable of mitigating budget slack behavior. The participants who will be used in this study are S1 and S2 students of YKPN College of Economics, Yogyakarta. The reason for choosing students as participants is because the assignments given in this experiment only require individual general cognitive abilities, not special abilities that require judgment and individual work experience. Research data collection was carried out using a 1 x 2 experimental design between subjects. The experiment will be carried out using a computer-assisted program. The assignment given was the assignment of "symbol matching" adopted from Nahartyo (2012). Budget slack variables are measured based on the variance between estimation and realization of the success of the task. Variable manipulation of self-certification against participants will be inserted in experimental case material. The hypothesis was tested using ANOVA statistical tools, by comparing the average variance between manipulation groups and control groups.


Keywords: budgetary slack; self-certification; budget participation



Partisipasi anggaran memunculkan masalah perilaku oportunis berupa slack anggaran. Slack anggaran terjadi pada saat pegawai mencoba memanfaatkan informasi untuk melebihkan estimasi sumber daya yang dibutuhkan atau menurunkan estimasi pendapatan yang mampu dicapai agar memudahkan mereka mencapai efisiensi biaya dan target kinerja, sehingga mendapat skor evaluasi kinerja yang lebih baik. Dari sudut pandang akuntansi, organisasi mencoba untuk mencegah atau mengurangi perilaku slack karena memiliki konsekuensi terhadap hilangnya peluang keuntungan atau peningkatan biaya. Penelitian ini bertujuan melakukan eksperimen laboratorium untuk menguji peran sertifikasi diri (self-certification) sebagai variabel yang mampu memitigasi perilaku slack anggaran. Partisipan yang akan digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah mahasiswa S1 dan S2 Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi YKPN, Yogyakarta. Alasan pemilihan mahasiswa sebagai partisipan adalah karena penugasan yang diberikan dalam eksperimen ini hanya membutuhkan kemampuan kognitif umum individu, bukan berupa kemampuan khusus yang membutuhkan judgment dan pengalaman kerja individu. Pengumpulan data penelitian dilakukan menggunakan desain eksperimen 1 x 2 antar subjek. Eksperimen akan dilaksanakan menggunakan program berbantuan komputer. Penugasan yang diberikan adalah penugasan “pencocokan simbol” yang diadopsi dari Nahartyo (2012). Variabel slack anggaran diukur berdasarkan variansi antara estimasi dan realisasi keberhasilan tugas. Manipulasi variabel sertifikasi diri terhadap partisipan akan diselipkan dalam material kasus eksperimen. Hipotesis diuji menggunakan alat statistik ANOVA, dengan membandingkan rata-rata variansi antar grup manipulasi dan grup kontrol.



Kata kunci : slack anggaran; sertifikasi diri; penganggaran partisipatif

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