KONFLIK KEPENTINGAN KLASIK BONDHOLDERS-SHAREHOLDERS DENGAN FRAME KONSERVATISME

Authors

  • Cahyo Indraswono STIE YKPN Yogyakarta

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24002/modus.v34i1.5023

Abstract

ABSTRACT

Conflicts of interest often occur in business conditions because there are many stakeholders in it. This study aims to further examine the classical conflict of interest between bondholders-shareholders in a conservatism frame. This research is interesting because the sample taken is a company indexed by the LQ45 index of the Indonesia Stock Exchange with a data observation period of 2016-2020. The choice of the LQ45 index is an indicator of actively traded companies with the highest market capitalization listed on the stock exchange, so that a reflection of conflict is expected to be seen in various industrial sectors. Bondholders are those who benefit when the company is not too aggressive in running its business. The purpose of the bondholder in business is to ensure the availability of payments that can occur and are sustainable for debt. Shareholders are the parties who benefit when the company has an optimal level of profit. However, these benefits are obtained by making loans with third parties from some of the assets owned. This conflict occurs when the availability of dividend payments to shareholders increases and the availability of payments on debt decreases, so that in various cases bondholders often make efforts to limit dividend payments. The company's profitability is the beginning of the bondholder-shareholder conflict of interest in accounting conservatism. The results obtained from this study: (1). The classic bondholders-shareholder conflict of interest has no effect on the conservatism frame; (2). The company's profitability has a positive effect on the conservatism frame.

 

Keywords:  conservatism frame; classical conflict of interest bondholders-shareholders; profitability; leverage; Return on Assets

 

ABSTRAK

Konflik kepentingan sering terjadi dalam kondisi bisnis karena banyaknya pemangku kepentingan berada di dalamnya. Penelitian ini bertujuan melihat lebih lanjut konflik kepentingan klasik antara bondholders-shareholders dalam bingkai konservatisme. Penelitian ini menjadi menarik karena sampel yang diambil adalah perusahaan terindeks indeks LQ45 Bursa Efek Indonesia dengan periode pengamatan data tahun 2016-2020. Pemilihan indeks LQ45 merupakan indikator perusahaan aktif diperdagangkan dengan kapitalisasi pasar tertinggi terdaftar di bursa saham, sehingga cerminan dari konflik diharapkan akan terlihat dari berbagai sektor industri. Bondholder merupakan pihak yang diuntungkan ketika perusahaan tidak terlalu agresif dalam menjalankan bisnisnya. Tujuan bondholder dalam bisnis adalah menjamin ketersediaan pembayaran dapat terjadi dan berkesinambungan terhadap utang. Shareholder merupakan pihak yang diuntungkan ketika perusahaan memiliki tingkat keuntungan yang optimal. Namun keuntungan tersebut didapatkan dengan cara melakukan pinjaman dengan pihak ketiga dari beberapa aset yang dimiliki. Konflik ini terjadi ketika ketersediaan pembayaran dividen bagi shareholder meningkat dan ketersediaan pembayaran atas utang menurun, sehingga dalam berbagai kasus bondholder sering melakukan upaya pembatasan dalam pembayaran dividen. Profitabilitas perusahaan merupakan awal dari konflik kepentingan bondholder-shareholder yang berada dalam konservatisme akuntansi. Hasil yang didapatkan dari penelitian ini: (1). Konflik kepentingan klasik bondholders-shareholders tidak berpengaruh terhadap frame konservatisme; (2). Profitabilitas perusahaan berpengaruh positif terhadap frame konservatisme.

 

Kata kunci:    frame konservatisme; konflik kepentingan klasik bondholders-shareholders; profitabilitas; leverage; Return on Assets

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Published

2022-01-25

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